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The present work aims to analyze the effect of labor reforms of employment protection 
on labor tax avoidance (LTA). Based on empirical studies related to tax avoidance and 
employment protection, the flexibility of labor reforms can lead to tax avoidance 
practices for social security contributions taking advantage on weak employment 
protection. Ravenda, Argilés-Bosch, & Valencia-Silva (2015) find consistent evidence that 
legally registered mafia firms (LMFs) are more involved in LTA than Lawful firms do. 
However, there is no evidence on the effect of level of employment protection on labor 
tax avoidance, so an analysis of the impact that these reforms cause to the tax 
authorities and the need to regulate them is carried out. 
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Nowadays, international labor agreements and reforms, encouraged by globalization and 
technology, have allowed firms cross borders through internationalization in pursuit of 
alternatives of flexible labor force. Innovation and technology are transforming firms in 
a way that makes employees, as subordinate workers, less necessary to hire, appealing 
to outsourcing figures. As a result, firms take advantages of this flexibilization in labor 
laws to avoid or reduce the payment of social security contribution to tax authorities. 
Therefore, new business models based have emerged based on “on-demand economy”, 
“sharing economy”, “gig economy” or “specific offline crowd work”, connecting 
customers and firms directly with individual service providers (Todolí-Signes, 2017). 
 
1.1. Research objective 
This paper aims to empirically examine the Labor Tax Avoidance at firm level using 
financial statement information and the effects that labor policies may have on tax 
collection of fiscal authorities. 
This work analyzes the effect of the employment protection on labor tax avoidance, 
because of the recent labor reforms in countries such as Spain, Italy and France, which 
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it is defined as the expenses evasion of employees’ social security contribution by 
employers. The study carried out by Ravenda, Argilés-Bosch, & Valencia-Silva (2015) on 
labor tax defines this concept more clearly as: “Labor tax consists of social security 
contributions and other insurances computed on gross wages of all employees that the 




The knowledge about the harmful effects of labor flexibilization due to regulatory 
changes in the labor reform in Spain can be an additional argument to detect and prevent 
the practice of labor tax avoidance. It also represents an improvement in the perception 
for workers and tax authorities on the results of labor tax avoidance when companies 
decide to make temporary contracts or undeclared work, keeping in mind the incidences 
of these avoidance practices and implementing control points to avoid them. 
The economic literature ha recognized that less employment protection should affect 
more labor tax avoidance since employers could use precarious and temporary 
contractual forms that allow them savings in social security or take advantage of 
government incentives to reduce these expenses, abusing these last ones like in 
countries such as Spain, Italy and France (Dell’Anno, Gómez-Antonio, & Pardo, 2007). 
Labor reforms regulate factors as: precariousness, part-time work, high youth 
unemployment and offshoring manufacturing studied by Martin & Prokkola (2017), 
undeclared work by Ravenda et al. (2015), self-employment and outsourcing services by 
Todolí-Signes (2017), low-skilled labor market by Bucher (2010). Among others, the 
labor tax avoidance is strongly related to extent of employment protection in labor 
reforms. The study of this topic helps to understand in depth which is the effect of the 
flexibilization of labor market and its relation with labor tax avoidance. 
 
1.3. Contributions 
Within the contribution to knowledge, there are no previous studies in the literature 
that analyze tax avoidance in labor reforms and more specifically the employment 
protection and labor tax avoidance using financial statement information and the effects 
that may influence its labor policies in tax collection of fiscal authorities. Furthermore, 
this study contributes to the business literature due to that it adopts new labor tax 
avoidance measures that may enhance further research on their effectiveness in other 
cultural, legal, and institutional contexts and for other types of firms. Most importantly, 
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it can contribute to protecting employees against illegal exploitation and to avoiding tax 
revenue loss in the social security system.  
 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. “Employment protection (EP): 
flexibilization of the labor market in the European Union” section introduces existing 
literature on employment protection; “Tax Avoidance (TV)” section motivates the 
research on tax avoidance; ”Labor reforms in Spain” section explore the labor regulations 
in Spain; “Related Research and Hypothesis Development” section reviews the existing 
research and develops the hypothesis; “Research Design” section describes the research 
design and sample data; “Expected Results” section presents empirical results and the 
analysis of data; “Conclusions” section concludes the paper. 
 
 
2. Literature review 
 
2.1. Employment protection: flexibilization of the labor market in the 
European Union  
 
The employment protection plays a very important role both for the public and private 
sectors. The usefulness of this topic works as a criterion to compare one country with 
another, in addition to reflecting its degree of development in particular. Therefore, it is 
necessary to develop an internationally recognized indicator that let simplify the process 
of evaluating the rate of employment protection in a country, and understand the criteria 
that should be used, summarizing the advantages and disadvantages of a country's labor 
policy (Otenko Pavlo, 2017). 
The International Labour Organization (2002) define employment in an informal 
economy as “economic activities by workers and economic units that are – in law or in 
practice – not covered or insufficiently covered by formal arrangements” (cited in Adriana 
Florez & Perales, 2016), and The Organisation for Economic Cooperation and 
Development [OECD] (2002) define Employment protection as: 
 
Employment protection refers both to regulations concerning hiring (e.g. rules 
favouring disadvantaged groups, conditions for using temporary or fixed-term 
contracts, training requirements) and firing (e.g. redundancy procedures, mandated 
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prenotification periods and severance payments, special requirements for collective 
dismissals and short-time work schemes). 
 
This problem is recognized both in developing and developed countries where 
informal workers do not contribute to social security nor are protected by law, lacking of 
benefits such as access to unemployment insurance, health insurance system and 
retirement pensions. These informal workers are less skilled and productive, hampering 
economic growth by avoiding the payment of taxes. As a result, government incomes 
and their ability to protect workers are reduced. For this reason, long-standing policy 
objective is the reduction of informal work in developed and developing countries. 
(Adriana Florez & Perales, 2016). 
Recent studies have found out a weakness in low employment protection hided in 
another side of the economy, called also informal Economy. The numerous and 
important effects on the lack in flexible labor reforms can reduce government incomes 
and distort official economic indicators as unemployment, income distribution, economic 
growth, etc. Thus, influencing public sector decisions on individual incentives and 
compensation factors. As a result, it has greatly increased in recent years an academic 
and political interest in OECD countries on labor reforms (Dell’Anno et al., 2007). 
The reasons that encourage the diffusion of labor market flexibility can be found in 
the literature regarding the possible costs and benefits of employment protection 
legislation for workers with temporary contracts. Temporary employment have probable 
but opposing effects on productivity. According to Engellandt y Riphahn (2005) 
temporary contracts benefit labor reassignment processes caused by technology or 
demand increases that require faster adaptation and changes in job skills. The other is 
an incentive effect, in the event that temporary employees aspire to obtain indefinite 
positions. Therefore, these agreements are used for the selection of new employees 
(cited in Damiani, Pompei, & Ricci, 2016). 
In addition, employers use temporary workers as a "buffer stock", since firms can 
easily adjust their workforce by varying the number of temporary contracts to respond 
rapidly to changes in demand and technology (Damiani et al., 2016).` 
According to Okudaira, Takizawa, & Tsuru (2013) in order to the effect on firm 
productivity through market distortion, employment protection also plays the role of 
commitment control to extract employee efforts, affecting worker productivity. Belot et 
al. (2002) analyse the existence of an optimal degree of employment protection in a 
situation where this one gives employees a motivation to invest in relation-specific skills. 
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They conclude in their research that the ideal level of firing cost is larger than zero in 
most cases, which indicates the possibility that rigorous protection enhances productivity 
by improving firm-specific skill investment. 
On the other hand, firing constraint may also induce opportunistic sabotage by 
employees when their effort level is unobservable. For example, Ichino and Riphahn 
(2005) affirm in their theoretical framework, that “lazy workers have an motivation to 
slack off and that this effect is aggravated when workers are strictly protected and firms’ 
monitoring no longer threatens them” (cited in Okudaira et al., 2013). 
According to Ponzellini, Aumayr, & Wolf (2010) in case of hiring costs for permanent 
contracts, significant firing and weak employment protection for fixed-term positions, 
firms will prefer replacing new employees into temporary works or with mid-term 
contracts, irrespective of other workers’ skills, including education. Deregulation of 
temporary jobs may hence lead to a higher occurrence of temporary employment 
expected at reducing present and future labor costs, with consequent grown and 
expansion of informal skills gaps and, ultimately, an increase of the wage gap (cited in 
Perugini & Pompei, 2016). 
Dell’Anno et al. (2007) adopted a quantitative method used to determine the size of 
the irregular economy by measuring indicators approaches and macroeconomic data, 
known as Multiple Indicators Multiple Causes (MIMIC) model. The MIMIC models contain 
four dependent causal variables such as unemployment, tax burden, self-employment 
and public employment, and three independent variables or indicators as currency ratio, 
real gross domestic product per capita and labour force participation. In order to work 
with homogeneous data and elaborate their econometric analysis, they used monthly 
and half yearly data from OECD Statistical Compendium Database for the countries as 
Spain, Italy and Greece. Their results obtained indicate that economic performances, 
measured in term of growth rate, seems to be a likely explanation of the changes in this 
irregular economy. A Low growth of this rate of per capita incomes and deficient 
provision of goods and services may further the need for additional or undeclared 
sources of income.  Unfortunately, because of the lack of available information and the 
unfeasibility of estimating an overly complex structural equation model regarding to the 
sample size they did not include other potential variables employed such as index of 
corruption, labour market flexibility and resources governments spend on combating tax 
evasion. 
In recent years, labor reforms have been implemented to increase flexibility in the 
labor market and decrease unemployment, especially since the global financial crisis of 
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2008. An article by Turrini et al. (2014) reviews the scope of these labor policies applied 
in European countries since 2008, and conclude that most of them have consisted in 
reducing the regulation of labor protection, being more common in Eastern and Western 
Europe. In general, this approach was implemented in several countries with high 
unemployment rates, especially southern European countries such as Portugal or Italy. 
According to Janiak and Wasmer (2014); Skedinger (2010) the purpose of these labor 
protection measures is to restrict firing and hiring by increasing the associated costs 
incurred by employers. Thereby, recent reforms in labor policies that increase the 
flexibility of the European market should result in a lower prevalence of informal 
employment. In contrast, there are supporters who consider that the scarce state 
intervention results in employees being motivated to informal employment due to that 
these workers perform informal jobs when the Government does not protect them and 
employers have more power, thus expanding practices such as subcontracting and staff 
reduction. Cahuc (2014) argues that "an employer who does not comply with basic 
standards such as health and safety in the workplace, and having a greater monopoly 
power and reforms that allow him to replace those workers at low cost, may fire workers 
who complain". Thereby, the recent reforms in labor policies that increase the flexibility 
of the European market should result in a higher prevalence of informal employment 
(cited in Adriana Florez & Perales, 2016). 
On the other hand, Drinkwater, Levine, Lotti, & Welt-Wirtschafts-Archiv (2003) 
investigated patterns related to the strength of legal employment protection for workers 
analyzing cross country variation in laws. They examined whether the impact of the 
credit crisis varied across countries using distinct levels of employment protection 
through the Employment Protection Index (EPLex) from the International Labour 
organization (ILO). This index provides a comparison among procedures governing 
permanent contracts of employment, and of employment protection legislation. 
In countries with stronger employment protection the estimated impacts on job 
including disproportionate impacts on temporary, younger, less skilled and migrant 
workers, are greatly higher and significant for permanent workers. This finding highlights 
similar studies arguing that the combination of stringent regulation for permanent 
employment with weak regulation for temporary work contracts has created a dual 
labour market in Europe, one in which the burden of adjustment falls disproportionately 
on temporary workers who even because of certain sectors also tend to be less skilled 
and younger than permanent workers (Drinkwater et al., 2003). 
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Regarding to less skilled workers, Bucher (2010) analyzed the firms´ and employees’ 
response to a specific hiring subsidy program when taking into account interactions 
among segments of the low-skilled labor market focusing on subsidy programs such as 
most of these that have been implemented in OECD countries for three decades: 
temporary subsidies designed for long-term unemployed. This analysis attempt to 
answer the research question “does an alternative form of the program improves the 
welfare of the economy?” and researches the effects of such a program on the low-
skilled labor market considering minimum wage constraint.  
In contrast to many continental European countries, one of these as Denmark, it has 
a very flexible labor market. Thus, the employment protection is weak, besides of 
turnover rates and average tenure are in alignment with those of the Anglo-Saxon 




2.2. Tax Avoidance  
 
The most of the tax avoidance literature focuses on the law and public finance fields, 
where several studies analyze different issues related to labor taxes in the informal 
economy (Dell’Anno et al., 2007), tax arbitrage and labor supply (Agell & Persson, 2000), 
distortionary effect of taxation on labor mobility (Kreiner et al., 2015) , and even the 
incentives that motivate CEOs to adopt more aggressive corporate tax reporting 
preferences (Kubick & Lockhart, 2016). 
In fact, the literature related to tax evasion refers to income tax evasion, or whether 
it has real effects on the supply of workforce, or whether it leads to changes in workers' 
compensation. In particular, literature reviews offer different issues in empirical research 
on tax evasion, as in the case of the empirical article by Hoopes, Thornock and Williams 
(2016) that deals on tax evasion in the digital economy. The term tax evasion generally 
refers to all actions that have the purpose of reducing tax liability. Slemrod and Kopczuk 
(2002), Piketty, Saez and Stantcheva (2014) and Uribe-Teran (2015) extend this 
definition by theoretically analyzing the elasticity of taxable income in the presence of 
tax evasion. One the other hand, Feldstein (1999) affirms that accounting for tax 
avoidance significantly increases estimates of the implied deadweight loss of income 
taxation (Degl’Innocenti & Rablen, 2017). 
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Douglas A.Shackelford (2001) conducted a study of the alternative minimum tax 
(AMT) impact on the reported earnings, where he found a downward trend in the income 
of the firms, this due to the firms shifted book earnings to avoid taxes. Boynton et al. 
(1992) confirmed this income shifting using actual tax returns to find AMT firms (cited 
in Douglas A.Shackelford, 2001). 
Agell & Persson (2000) suggest that studies that ignore tax avoidance may easily 
come up with biased estimates of the tax responsiveness of the labor supply of high-
wage individuals. In addition, due to tax avoidance, international comparisons of income 
inequality will overstate the redistributive achievements of high tax countries like 
Sweden. Slemrod (2001) affirm that there is much evidence that suggest the class of 
avoidance behaviors is more responsive to tax changes than are real substitution 
responses. His work used the Allingham-Sandmo model or so called standard model 
because it has the advantage of being explicit about the costs of tax evasion. He 
examines time series data on Michigan using dependent variable as income and 
independent variables as wage rate and non-labor income, implemented in 1981 and 
1986.  
Ravenda et al. (2015) focus their study on labor tax and develop two new measures 
of labor tax avoidance based on social contribution expenses reported in financial 
statement using a sample of 224 Italian firms known as legally registered Mafia firms 
due to its connection with Italian organized crime. Further, they examine the effect that 
the confiscation of the firms and their assignment to legal administrator may have on 
labor tax avoidance. The financial statements of all firms were obtained from Asylum 
Information Database (AIDA), the Italian bureau Van Dijk database. The legally 
registered mafia firms’ sample consists of firms confiscated to organized crime during 
1994 – 2013 period. This study empirically tests hypothesis with a Base Regression Model 
using as dependent variables two measures of labor tax avoidance, reported sales and 
material consumption and as independent variables they used binary variables for Legally 
registered Mafia firms before and after confiscation.  
 
 
2.3. Labor reforms in Spain 
 
In recent years Spain has gone through a severe economic crisis since 2008, which 
highlighted the weaknesses of the current labor model, and resulted in several changes 
in labor reforms. The severity of the destruction of employment and the economic 
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situation demanded to adopt an immediate reform that provide legal security to 
economic agents in order to get recover the employment (Real Decreto Ley-3/2012, 
2012). The legislative changes were made in 2010, by Real Decreto-Ley 35/2010 de 17 
de septiembre, de Medidas Urgentes para la Reforma del Mercado de Trabajo; and in 
2012, by Real Decreto-Ley 3/2012 de 10 de febrero, De Medidas Urgentes Para La 
Reforma Del Mercado Laboral; this last one more flexible than above (Barroso, 2017). 
Real Decreto-Ley 35/2010 deals that the basic problems of the labor market are a 
"very high temporary hiring, which it means a third of the hired population by 
employment"; scarce measures of internal flexibility legislation; discrimination of 
collectives such as people with disabilities, elderly and female; and low capacity to place 
employment public services. These measures were based on three main ideas. First, 
reduce labor duality to encourage employment stability and flexibility of firms through 
the creation of new jobs; second, to strengthen the instruments of internal flexibility by 
reducing the working day, in order to reduce the problem of precarization of the labor 
market with more temporary contracts and reduced working hours; and third, improve 
access to the labor market for collectives at risk of exclusion, such as young people 
through training contracts and improvement of labor intermediation (Carmona, 2012). 
On the other hand, according to Real Decreto Ley-3/2012 (2012) the labor reform 
eliminated the regulations on collective dismissals, as the record of employment 
regulation, and introduced the possibility of collective dismissals in the public sector, 
facilitating the dismissals for economic reasons. Currently, it is considered as collective 
dismissals if they comply with economic, technical, organizational and productive reasons 
(cited in Barroso, 2017), for example, employers can introduce unilateral changes in 
working conditions such as wages, work schedules, working hours, as long as they meet 
the conditions mentioned above (OECD, 2013). 
This labor reform has a clear change of conception on the subordination of 
employment to the economy, with the manifestation of its purposes as recovery, creation 
and stabilization of employment, encouraging the generation of security not only of 
workers as an active part of the labor market, but the stabilization of the whole society. 
Specifically, it tries to create measures of internal and external flexibility for employers 
to manage their human resources according to their economic need, and in order to 
"create security for workers in employment and in levels of social protection, thus 
satisfying the interests of all ", changing the previous conception of security related to 
the job and its evolution in the form of professional career for security in terms of 
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employment, that is, the activation and motivation of workers in the labor market and 




2.4. Related Research and Hypothesis Development 
 
Martin & Prokkola (2017) affirm that: “Research and organizing around precarity has 
problematized the flexibilisation of labour through short-term and zero-hours contracts, 
part-time work, non-unionized work-places, high youth unemployment, offshoring 
manufacturing and outsourcing state services”.  
Bucher (2010) developed an econometric model, this one is computed above French 
data to estimate the employment and welfare effects of a measure introduced in this 
country in 1995. Therefore, a general equilibrium model as Mortensen Pissarides 
matching model, captures the main features of the low skilled labor market using as 
independent variables the benchmark economy, economy with the French contract, 
economy with the optimal contract and economy with the optimal policy. The basic 
framework is extended to include heterogeneities of unemployed and jobs. The work 
considers an economy with an exogenous number of workers and an endogenous 
number of firms. The contribution of this research is to provide a macroeconomic 
assessment of French programs. Since results suggest that the French contract is near 
to be optimal and the subsidy program has a significant impact on population, hiring 
prospects of long term unemployed workers get better, in contrast to the related 
unemployment rate fall. Nevertheless, this could improve by increasing the participation 
rate of firms as well as the subsidy rate and by reducing the subsidy duration. 
Ravenda et al. (2015) show in their results that correlations between independent 
variables of base regression model are low, thus providing a first indication that 
collinearity is improbably to affect estimations. The model was estimated through a linear 
regression with panel corrected standard errors in order to consider heteroskedasticity. 
The consistence of results among both measures provides evidence of robustness in 
front of possible manipulations that may affect both material consumption and sales 
reported figures. These results are robust to a variety of estimation methodologies. One 
of the positive aspects of this study is that could be replicated in other countries, where 
organized crime is deeply rooted or Undeclared Work is a widespread practice, in 
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order to determine whether its results are confirmed in a different cultural, legal, and 
institutional context. 
This study is related to the incidence of the labor reforms flexibility in labor tax 
avoidance, since employers could use precarious and temporary contractual forms that 
allow them savings in social security or take advantage of government incentives to 
reduce these expenses, abusing these one like in countries such as Spain, Italy and 
France (Dell’Anno et al., 2007). All this could occur after having more easily dismissed 
(by reducing the protection) the more expensive labor force. Similarly, the lower 
protection of employees gives employers more contractual force and intimidation that 
facilitate these harmful practices to workers and to the national social security system 
that already suffers many problems of sustainability. 
 




3.1. Sources of information 
 
The main platform to access the reviewing of the theoretical framework regarding the 
Employment protection and labor tax avoidance proposed by some authors, as well as 
the reviewed in the literature written on this current paper was the Recercador 
instrument of the University of Barcelona through academic articles available from 
scientific databases such as Scopus, Web of Science and Emerald Management, being 
able to easily access these databases where has found relevant information for the 
research work, likewise perform analysis of different papers that present results in 




The sample of the present paper can be obtained through the SABI database, because 
of it will be carried out a quantitative methodology of empirically based. Specifically, it 
is about taking all those companies that belong to sectors more susceptible to labor 
flexibility within of Spain, having a range of 2 periods of time, which will be identified as 
a dummy variable "Change" among before and after of labor reforms. On the one hand, 
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the decrease of labor tax avoidance by companies is analyzed in the prior period to labor 
reforms, with more rigorous policies in the labor market, and on the other hand, the 
increase of this one when there are flexible labor reforms with less employment 
protection. Therefore, the information must be of the two periods of time in the 
implementation of labor reforms. 
 
 
3.3. Empirical model 
 
 
This study formulate a empirical model where the independent variable is LTA 
depends on the variables of interest, change of the period of time (CHANGE) and time 
(YEAR), as well as on a set of control variables (CONTROLS), which previous research 
on tax avoidance and the only published paper on LTA (Ravenda et al., 2015), examine 
relevant determinants of tax avoidance in legally registered Mafia firms, and based on 
their study, we can consider that they are interesting in the building of our empirical 
model. 
 
 𝐿𝑇𝐴 𝔦, 𝔱=𝛽₀ + 𝛽₁ · 𝐶𝐻𝐴𝑁𝐺𝐸 𝔦, 𝔱 +  𝛽₂ · 𝑌𝐸𝐴𝑅 𝔦, 𝔱 + ∑ 𝛽к · 𝐶𝑂𝑁𝑇𝑅𝑂𝐿 к, 𝔦, 𝔱 + Ԑ 𝔦, 𝔱  
 
In order to detect whether the change in labor reforms influences the level of labor 
tax avoidance, the main variables are investigated: Social Contribution expenses (SOC) 
in relation with Wages, Social Contribution expenses (SOC) in relation with Sales, and 
their corresponding abnormal (residual and quintile); these variables would set the 
independent variables and labor tax avoidance as a dependent variable. 
This study aims to perform an empirical study based on the information collected from 
the SABI database, developing measures of labor tax avoidance based on social 
contribution expenses reported in financial statements and test them within a sample of 
Spanish firms that correspond to a period of time of a function depending on the variable 
“change”, where the control variables will be computed in two periods, before and after 
labor reforms. The information will be extracted from SABI database where the item 
social security cost from companies can be found there. 
For the measurement of labor tax avoidance of this empirical work the dependent 
variables are two measures represented by abnormal social contribution expenses 
(ABSOC). Therefore, lower ABSOCs suggest higher probability of firm engagement in 
labor tax avoidance and vice versa. 
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To test the hypothesis, a wide sample of data is accessed within the two periods. The 
models are based on prior studies (Ravenda et al., 2015), applying some modifications 
to focus on this study. 
The employment of undeclared work by reducing personnel expenses has the effect 
of increasing taxable income and income tax burden. Firms may compensate this through 
a fraudulent understatement of sales revenues in order to reduce income tax as well as 
value added tax payable. The dummy variable corresponds in two stages, before and 
after the labor reform period. 
Overall, the study reveal that before rigorous labor reforms firms engage more labor 
tax avoidance, whereas after labor reforms there is no significant influence on the 





This article analyze the relationship between employment protection and labor tax 
avoidance within the European framework, specifically in Spain. The study extends the 
scant existing literature through an empirical analysis of the incidence of the labor 
reforms on LTA, which consists of control variables that examine the Labor Tax 
Avoidance at firm level using financial statement information and the effects that labor 
policies may have on tax collection of fiscal authorities.  
The hypothesis is that less protection involve more labor tax avoidance since 
employers use precarious and temporary contractual forms that allow them savings in 
social security or take advantage of government incentives to reduce these expenses, 
abusing these last ones. 
The empirical model contains LTA, which depends on experimental variables providing 
test for the hypotheses, as well as on a set of control variables, commonly used in 
previous studies on tax avoidance and with theoretical underpinning for their influence 
on LTA. In order to build the data, we should use a panel data sample of ten years of 
Spanish firms using a dummy variable that corresponds to two stages. The control 
variables will be computed in two periods, before and after the labor reforms period, 
based on social contribution expenses reported in financial statements that correspond 
to a period of time of a function depending on the variable “change”. 
The study aim to find that firms with lower employment protection in labor reforms 
are significantly more labour tax avoidant than stringent labor reforms and to reveal 
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robust results to all measures of LTA used in this study, as well as to different sample 
selection and estimation methods. 
In the last decade, according to Turrini et al. (2014), European countries have 
implemented policies and reforms promoting labour market flexibility, such as reducing 
the generosity of unemployment benefit system and weakening regulation of 
employment protection, in order to become more competitive in the global economy 
(cited in Adriana Florez & Perales, 2016). 
This study should analyze sectors historically with labor precariousness because of 
that these ones are more probable to be affected by these practices due to their 
particular characteristics as high temporality, precariousness, low professional 
qualification, etc. Some of these sectors could be, for example: construction, hospitality, 
agriculture, although the election would have to be justified with concrete data. 
Within the contribution to knowledge, there are no previous studies in the literature 
that analyze tax avoidance in labor reforms and more specifically the employment 
protection and labor tax avoidance using financial statement information and the effects 
that labor policies may have on tax collection of fiscal authorities. Therefore, this study 
contributes to tax avoidance and business literature with an empirical study on LTAV, 
and increases our knowledge of the irregular economy due to that it adopts new labor 
tax avoidance measures that may enhance further research on their effectiveness in 
other cultural, legal, and institutional contexts and for other types of firms. 
Most importantly, it can contribute to protecting employees against illegal exploitation 
and to avoiding tax revenue loss in the social security system. More specifically, it has 
important social and academic implications, given that it would be the first study to 
empirically test the higher LTA practices within the labor reforms, and that it stands out 
the need of more regulation for the non-qualified employment agreements which are 
increasingly applied in the irregular economy. 
There are two lines of research meaningfully relevant as the study of unemployment 
of undeclared work typical of public economics or labor relation areas, and another 
consists of studies on income tax avoidance mostly focused in the business and 
accounting areas. Additionally, it can be set as a study purpose to analyze the effect of 
policies in the reduction of employment protection, because of the recent labor reforms 
in countries such as Spain, Italy and France, on labor tax avoidance, which it is defined 
as the expenses evasion of employees’ social security contribution by employers 
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